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Recent theories from complexity science argue that complex dynamics are 
ubiquitous in social and economic systems.  These claims emerge from the analysis of 
individually simple agents whose collective behavior is surprisingly complicated.  
However, economists have argued that iterated reasoning––what you think I think you 
think––will suppress complex dynamics by stabilizing or accelerating convergence to 
Nash equilibrium. We report stable and efficient periodic behavior in human groups 
playing the Mod Game, a multi-player game similar to Rock-Paper-Scissors. The game 
rewards subjects for thinking exactly one step ahead of others in their group. Groups that 
play this game exhibit cycles that are inconsistent with any fixed-point solution concept. 
These cycles are driven by a “hopping” behavior that is consistent with other accounts of 
iterated reasoning: agents are constrained to about two steps of iterated reasoning and 
learn an additional one-half step with each session. If higher-order reasoning can be 
complicit in complex emergent dynamics, then cyclic and chaotic patterns may be 
endogenous features of real-world social and economic systems. 
Keywords: behavioral game theory, non-equilibrium game theory, iterated reasoning, 
higher-level reasoning, limit cycles, Rock-Paper-Scissors 
 
Introduction 
When seen at the level of the entire group, the reasoning of many individuals can 
lead to unexpected collective outcomes, like wise crowds, market equilibrium, or 
tragedies of the commons. In these cases, people with limited reasoning can converge 
upon the behavior of rational agents. However, limited reasoning can also reinforce 
dynamics that do not converge upon a fixed-point. We show that bounded iterated 
reasoning through the reasoning of others can support a stable and profitable collective 
behavior consistent with the limit cycle regimes of many standard models of game 
learning.  
A limit cycle is a set of points within a closed trajectory, and it is among the 
simplest non-fixed-point attractors. Game theorists have been demonstrating the 
theoretical existence of limit cycle attractors since the 1960s (Shapley, 1964) and cyclic 
dynamics have been identified in every classic learning model (Fudenberg & Kreps, 
1993; Hommes & Ochea, 2011; Jordan, 1993; Sato, Akiyama, & Crutchfield, 2005). In 
some models, cyclic regimes emerge when payoff (or sensitivity to it) is low (Sato & 
Crutchfield, 2003). Theorists, particularly those interested in the replicator dynamic, 
have also discovered more complex attractors in belief space, like chaos in simple and 
complex games (Galla & Farmer, 2011; Sato, Akiyama, & Farmer, 2002). Kleinberg et 
al. (2011) remind us that cyclic learning dynamics may be more efficient than those that 
converge to a fixed point.  
Should we expect similar complexity in actual human behavior? Humans are 
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capable of “higher” types of reasoning that are absent from most theoretical models, and 
that have not been empirically implicated in complex dynamics. In work to demonstrate 
the stabilizing role of iterated reasoning, Selten proved that for a large class of 
mixed-strategy games, and sufficiently slow learning, adding iterated reasoning to a 
simple replicator dynamic guarantees the local stability of all Nash equilibria (1991).  
Behavioral experiments have supported the thrust of this claim (Bloomfield, 1994; Tang, 
2001) and, in work with a similar motivation, Camerer et al. showed that iterated 
reasoning can help standard adaptive learning models converge to Nash equilibrium at 
the rates observed in humans (2002a). 
Cyclic game dynamics have been observed in organisms that are not capable of 
higher-order reasoning. Animal behavior researchers have described the role of periodic 
dynamics in resolving coordination conflicts in the producer-scrounger problem (Rands, 
Cowlishaw, Pettifor, Rowcliffe, & Johnstone, 2003; Sumpter, 2010, p. 149). 
Rock-Paper-Scissors relations, and cycles within them, have been identified among 
side-blotched lizards and in vitro and in vivo populations of E. Coli, and they have been 
implicated in the maintenance of species diversity (Alonzo & Sinervo, 2001; Kerr, Riley, 
Feldman, & Bohannan, 2002; Kirkup & Riley, 2004; Reichenbach, Mobilia, & Frey, 
2007).  
When experimentalists entertain dynamic models of human behavior, they tend 
to treat non-Nash behavior as part of the process of eventually converging to Nash 
(Camerer, 2003, p. 270). However, experiments in games that prescribe random 
(mixed-strategy) play document sustained distance from predicted equilibria and/or 
failure to converge to a fixed point (Bloomfield, 1994; Bottazzi & Devetag, 2007; Brown 
& Rosenthal, 1990; Crawford & Iriberri, 2007a; Duffy & Hopkins, 2005; Hoffman, 
Suetens, Nowak, & Gneezy, 2012; Rapoport & Budescu, 1992; Rubinstein & Tversky, 
1993). These studies account for their results by citing cognitive limits, poor motivation, 
or by resorting to alternative, sometimes unspecified, solution concepts. However, there 
is also positive behavioral evidence for specific higher-dimensional attractors. One 
example is the Edgeworth cycle in duopolistic markets (Cason, Friedman, & Wagener, 
2005; Eckert & West, 2004; Edgeworth, 1925; Noel, 2007; Zhang & Feng, 2005), 
though its mechanism does not invoke learning or implicate higher-order reasoning. 
Another example is the hog cycle that motivated rational expectations theory (Muth, 
1961). Recently, experimentalists have been observing cyclic choice dynamics in the lab 
as well (Bednar, Chen, Liu, & Page, 2012; Cason, Friedman, & Hopkins, 2012). 
We introduce the Mod Game, an n-player generalization of Rock-Paper-Scissors. 
Its name evokes a couturier's designs to anticipate the recurrence of previously outmoded 
fads within a peer community. Behavior in the game is inconsistent with any fixed-point 
attractor concept, and consistent with the long history of predictions of cyclic attractors 
in game learning. This result comes with evidence for iterated reasoning through the 





The Mod Game 
In the Mod Game, n participants choose an integer in the range {1, …, m} for n 
and m both greater than one. Every participant earns a point for each choice by another 
that they exceeded by exactly one; e.g., Choice 3 dominates (or “beats”) Choice 2 (and 
only Choice 2), and Choice 2 beats Choice 1. The exception to this scoring rule is that 
Choice 1 beats Choice m.  This exception gives the game the intransitive dominance 
structure of Rock-Paper-Scissors, in which there is no single action that cannot be 
dominated by some other action. All players in a group play against all others 
simultaneously each round, so a player beating two others receives two points, and two 
players each earn one point if they both chose the same choice and beat a third player. A 
player whose choice is not exactly one more than another’s scores zero points. The game 
is not zero-sum and players do not lose any points for making choices that benefit other 
group members.  
In our implementation, the maximum integer choice m equaled 24.  At m = 3, the 
game is a non-zero-sum version of Rock-Paper-Scissors. Experimentalists have observed 
cyclic dynamics in intransitive games with m equal to two and three (Bednar et al., 2012; 
Cason et al., 2012). However, larger values of m permit greater discrimination between 
potential reasoning processes behind behavior. For example, with only three strategies it 
is very difficult to determine whether Rock, as a response to Scissors, is the result of 
zero, three, or even six levels of iterating reasoning. By increasing the number of 
cyclically arranged choices to 24, we can determine the order of iterated reasoning with 
less ambiguity. 
Experimental design 
After all decisions were submitted, all of the round’s choices and earnings were 
revealed to all players, and the game was repeated for 200 rounds. We also tested a 
symmetric condition (decrement) in which the scoring rule was reversed and players 
were rewarded for choices exactly one less than those of other participants, with the 
exception of Choice 24, which rewarded one point for each group member that selected 
Choice 1. This second condition helped distinguish the effects of the scoring rule from 
other possible incidental effects of the experimental environment.  
Procedure 
Over 22 sessions at Indiana University, 123 psychology undergraduates played in 
groups of 2–10. The scoring rule does not demand a specific group size, and our design 
only controlled for group size statistically. Figures S2-S9 summarize the complete data 
from the experiment. Table 1 lists the group sizes for each session. Participants were 
instructed to earn as many points as possible. In addition to course credit for appearing at 
the experiment, they were given a cash bonus based on the number of points they earned 
over all rounds. Specifically, one of every ten rounds was randomly selected as a “pay 
round” in which participants were rewarded 10¢ for each point. In all rounds, a 
participant has six seconds to make a non-null decision. Six seconds was ample time for 
most participants; only 1.5% of decisions were null. The mean session lasted 24 minutes.  
Subjects sat at curtained terminals, and interacted with a graphical Java-based 
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interface using the HubNet plugin for NetLogo (Wilensky, n.d.; Wilensky & Stroup, 
n.d.). After the experiment administrator read the instructions publicly, subjects were 
given time to read the text of the instructions individually.  
You are playing a game with other people. Your goal is to earn as many points 
as possible. Everyone in your group will choose from a circle of numbered 
squares 200 times. Your goal is to choose a square that is one more [less] than 
other people's squares. The squares wrap around so that the lowest [highest] 
choice counts as just above the highest [lowest] (like an ace sometimes counts as 
higher than a king, but still below a two). You get one point for every person 
who you are above [below] by only one square. 
As a bonus, you will be paid for earning as many points as you can. We will pick 
twenty random rounds and pay you 10 cents per point. 
The experiment began after all participants finished reviewing the instructions. Subjects’ 
24 strategies were arrayed visually in a circle (Figure 1). To distinguish the potential 
visual salience of specific choices (e.g. the highest and lowest numbers 1 and 24) from 
that of specific screen locations (e.g. the top-, bottom-, and right-most choices), each 
group was presented with a circle whose choices had been rotated by a different random 
amount at the initialization of the experiment. Averaging over all rounds and sessions, 
participants showed mild preferences for choices 1, 7, 24, and no particular preference 
for any visual location on the circle. Figure 1 shows the graphical interface of the game.  
Though participants were instructed to earn as many points as possible, some 
exhibited behavior that could not have assisted them towards this end. In particular, 
some participants repeated their previous round’s choice for large parts of the 
experiment. Of an original 167 participants, 8 had “streaks” of the same choice for 25 or 
more rounds in row (1/8 of the total experimental session). In group experiments, 
individuals influence their group’s behavior, so we cautiously threw away all 8 
experiments in which these 8 subjects had participated. The resulting subject pool had 
123 participants. The discussion will explore questions of motivation and robustness but, 
in summary, the results we report are robust to an analysis that includes all 167 
participants, and the complete discarded data are available for inspection in Figures S8 
and S9.  
Ethics Statement 
This manuscript reports experimental data from human subjects. Written 
informed consent was obtained after the nature and possible consequences of the studies 
were explained.  The research contained in this submission was approved by the 
Indiana University Institutional Review Board. 
Measures 
In games with mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, there is prior experimental 
evidence for two related-but-distinct outcomes: a failure to converge to some fixed-point 
solution concept (like Nash equilibrium) and a failure to converge to any fixed-point 
solution concept. These can be established in a Mod Game with an assortment of 
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complimentary dependent measures. Other methods, like frequency analysis, can then be 
used towards supporting alternatives to fixed-point convergence. 
We used participant time series––vectors of 200 integers valued 1 through 24––to 
measure entropy, efficiency, distance, and two measures of sequential dependence, rate 
and acceleration. Entropy is the information entropy of each individual’s time series 
(Shannon, 1948). Information entropy is a measure of disorder in distributions, such that 
samples from uniform distributions offer the least information per observation. This 
measure can be used to compare the disorder in observed behavior to that of a random 
benchmark. For each participant i, information entropy, H(Xi), was calculated from the 
empirical probability distribution function of random variable Xi, which can take the 24 




Efficiency is the percentage of points scored in a round, out of the maximum 
possible for that group size. Efficient behavior in the Mod Game is profitable behavior, 
and is an implicit measure of the effectiveness of groups to coordinate for greater gains. 
Efficiency E was measured for each round t, as E(t) = ! (t)( n / 2!" #$ n / 2%! &#)
, where π(t) is the 
sum of points earned at t, and n is the group size. The denominator gives the maximum 
possible number of points within a round of the game; Efficiency is constrained to the [0, 
1] interval. Maximum efficiency can be achieved if half of the members of a group (or 
about half, for odd group sizes) select one choice, and the other half select a choice 
exactly one above or below.  
We introduced distance to measure the clustering of choices within rounds. 
Clustering is a type of coordination that has been observed in similar environments (S. 
Frey & Goldstone, 2011). Taking the distance between two participants as the shortest 
path between them on the circle of choices, the value of distance in a round is the mean 
of the distances between all pairs of choices in that round. Low values of distance imply 
more clustering of choices within a round. Distance Di(t) was measured for each subject 
at each round t. Subject i's choice in a round is denoted by si(t), and the choices of the 
other group members are S-i(t).  Di (t) =
1
n min( b! aj"S! i (t )
# , (a+ 24)! b )  where a and b 
are min(si(t), j) and max(si(t), j). This function identifies the shortest paths between 
choices 5 & 7 and 1 & 23 as having distance 2, rather than 22. A round’s distance D(t) 
was a mean of individual distances, D(t) = 1n Di (t)i=1
n
! . 
The last two measures gave insight into sequential dependence––how a choice in 
one round predicts choices in future rounds. While series of random choices should be 
statistically independent, past experiments in games with intransitive dominance have 
documented significant sequential dependencies, usually attributed to cognitive or 
 7 
 
motivational limits (Bottazzi & Devetag, 2007; Duffy & Hopkins, 2005; Rapoport & 
Budescu, 1992).  
We tested for sequential dependence with analyses of the distributions of first 
and second differences of participant time series, what we define as rate and 
acceleration. We calculated rate as the time series of 199 differences between 
consecutive raw choices, modulo 24. The modulus was taken to define rate on the 
interval {0, …, 23}. The second difference is the sequence of 198 differences between 
consecutive first differences, also converted to the interval {0, …, 23}. Under random 
behavior, these constructs should be uniformly distributed, like the raw choices from 
which they are calculated. These tests of dependence motivated further tests for 
periodicity in the observed behavior. 
Predictions 
Hypothesis 1: Behavior in the Mod Game will be consistent with uniformly 
random behavior. 
The Mod Game is intransitive in that there is no single action that cannot be 
dominated by another; the game has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. For group sizes 
that are not evenly divisible by twenty-four, and for all of the group sizes we tested, the 
unique Nash equilibrium is to randomly choose from the 24 choices uniformly. This 
mixed-strategy equilibrium may seem to be a very naïve null model of actual human 
behavior –– Botazzi and Devetag observe that random play is only rational when others 
are expected to play randomly (2007). However, more recent and psychologically 
plausible solution concepts also predict uniformly random behavior in the Mod Game 
(e.g. the Cognitive Hierarchy of Camerer, Ho, & Chong, 2002b, and quantal response 
equilibrium, McKelvey & Palfrey, 1995). 
Hypothesis 1 can be rejected using any of the first three measures. Compute 
benchmark values of entropy, efficiency, and clustering for simulated agents with 
uniformly random behavior. Though baseline entropy is simple to compute by hand, the 
other two measures have different baseline values for different group sizes, and 
simulation was more convenient. If observed values of these measures are significantly 
different from random benchmark values, Hypothesis 1 can be rejected.  
Rejecting Hypothesis 1 would not be particularly provocative. Deviations from 
uniformly random behavior, which are typical at the individual level anyway, are as 
likely to result from individual cognitive limits as from convergence upon a higher 
dimensional attractor.  
Hypothesis 2: Behavior in the Mod Game will be consistent with some 
fixed-point of a learning dynamic. 
This hypothesis can be rejected by looking at sequential dependence.  Even if 
participants do not converge upon uniformly random play, they may have settled upon 
some other, possibly less principled mixed-strategy.  Significant sequential dependence 
(or a meaningful rate in the terms above) is incompatible with mixed-strategy play; if the 
distribution of observed rates is significantly different from a uniform distribution over 
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{1, …, 24}, than we can reject Hypothesis 2, that behavior in the Mod Game is 
consistent with convergence to a fixed-point.  However, as with Hypothesis 1, rejecting 
this second Hypothesis is not particularly provocative.  Non-convergent dynamics have 
been isolated in iterated games, particularly in games with mixed-strategy equilibria. 
Hypothesis 3: Behavior in the Mod Game will be consistent with the 
convergence of beliefs towards a periodic attractor. 
This hypothesis is motivated by observations, in every major class of learning 
model, of cyclic attractors in games with mixed-strategy equilibria. Supporting 
Hypotheses 1 or 2 precludes support for Hypothesis 3. 
Many high dimensional attractors can exhibit periodicity. While the most 
common is the limit cycle, this Hypothesis does not specify an attractor, merely that it 
will have periodic dynamics.  Periodicity can be established with Fourier analysis, 
though it takes statistical methods peculiar to frequency space to distinguish a specific 
frequency component, or an entire spectrum, from white noise. 
 
Results 
Result 1: Behavior was inconsistent with uniformly random mixed-strategies. 
The entropy expected from random play was above the 99% confidence interval for 
observed entropy (Figure 2). Both efficiency and distance measures suggest that 
participant’s choices were statistically dependent upon each other. Mean efficiency was 
significantly higher than that expected from random behavior, and participants’ choices 
clustered significantly by round.  
Result 2: Behavior was inconsistent with convergence to any fixed-point. A 
participant’s behavior in a given round was also dependent on their behavior in the 
previous round. Figure 3 shows the distribution of observed and randomized choices, 
rates, and accelerations, over both conditions. Participants tended to select a choice 4-8 
choices “ahead” of their previous choice (modulo 24, and “behind” for subjects in the 
decrement condition). Sequential changes to this rate were small; 53.2% of 
accelerations––over 24,043 individual decisions––either maintained the previous 
round’s rate or stayed within two choices of it.  
Result 3: Behavior was consistent with convergence to a periodic attractor. 
If rate is a meaningful construct in this game, whose strategies are arranged in a circle, 
then stable rate implies stable periodicity. If participants cycle stably around the strategy 
set (the circle of choices), any periodicity will show in a Fourier decomposition of their 
choice sequences. A frequency spectrum may exhibit a larger component at the 
frequency predicted by the mean rate of rotation.  
Since the time series of participants in a group are dependent on each other, data 
were resampled prior to the frequency analysis. We bootstrapped an independent 
distribution of observations by randomly selecting one participant’s time series from 
each of the (statistically independent) groups, and we repeated this sampling procedure 
1000 times. Each resulting time series was transformed to the frequency domain with the 
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FFT. Before this operation, missing choices (from the 1.5% of rounds in which an 
individual made no entry, leaving 24,034 of 24,400 data points) were cautiously replaced 
with uniform noise from the integer interval {1, …, 24}. Reported spectra and 
confidence intervals were estimated from this large bootstrapped sample of spectra. The 
white noise registers artificially low amplitude at frequency zero because of how the data 
were normalized for transfer to the frequency domain. 
We combined data from the increment and decrement conditions by artificially 
“flipping” all data in the decrement condition to exhibit positive rotation, as in 
f (x) = !xmod24 . Because phase information is discarded in the analysis of frequency 
spectra, this manipulation should not compromise the analysis.  
Data were also transformed prior to the frequency analysis. Because of the 
“jump” between Choices 1 and 24, any cycles around the raw choices describe a 
sawtooth curve. Sawtooth curves exhibits well-documented artifacts in frequency spectra, 
such that a sawtooth with fixed frequency will register many components after 
decomposition by the Fourier method. To control these artifacts prior to frequency 
analysis, each time series was transformed to represent the shortest distance from an 
arbitrary fixed point on the circle of strategies (e.g. Choice 1); for Choice x scaled to the 
interval [-1,1], f (x) = 2x !1 . This alternative representation varies without the large 
periodic discontinuities that characterize sawtooth curves, and the component for the 
basic frequency of a transformed sawtooth curve be attended by fewer artifactual 
components. 
We then conducted a distributional test in the frequency domain as a preliminary 
test for periodicity (Figure 4). The Box-Ljung Q test examines statistical features of an 
autocorrelation to test the null hypothesis of sequential independence in a time series. 
The test statistic is χ2 distributed, with degrees of freedom equal to the number of lags, 
such that with 10 lags the null value of the statistic is equal to 10. A bootstrapped 
distribution of observed values of the statistic had a mean of 36.6, over 99% CI [36.5, 
36.7]. Under this test, we rejected the hypothesis that observed power spectra were 
generated by random series (χ210=33.6, p<0.001). 
We complemented the distributional test with a point test for stable periodic 
behavior at a predicted frequency. This prediction was based on the mean rate of rotation, 
estimated as the mean of a von Mises distribution fit to the histogram in panel 2 of Figure 
3. The von Mises distribution is a circular analogue of the normal distribution and it is 
apt because a) a rate of 0 is equidistant from rates 1 and 23 and b) if an observed rate of x 
corresponds to intended motion at all, it may reflect an intention to advance by x plus 
any integer multiple of twenty-four (including intended motion “backwards”).  
As fit to a von Mises distribution, the maximum-likelihood mean rate was 4.7 
choices per round, corresponding to a predicted frequency of 0.2 rotations per round. A 
bootstrapped empirical distribution of the amplitude of the 0.2 frequency component 
placed it above the amplitude expected from random behavior (mean 1.06, 99% CI [1.04, 
1.08], above the amplitude of noise at 0.82).  
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Video of a typical session gives a subjective associate to the statistical support for 
periodicity (Figure S1). Video also shows that rotation and clustering seem to emerge 
together, two facets of the same phenomenon. 
Result 4: Rate of rotation increased with time.  
We used linear mixed effects to test potential modulators of participant rate. Our 
model of rate 
Ratei,subj,group = !0 +!round +!groupsize +!condition + (usubj +ugroup + ei,subj,group )  
controlled for both individual- and group-level differences, modeled as random effects 
usubj and ugroup. βround and βgroupsize fit for the effects of time (with values {1, …, 200}) 
and group size. βcondition fit any difference between the increment and decrement 
conditions. We compared this model with the three reduced models 
Ratei,subj,group = !0 +!round +!groupsize + (usubj +ugroup + ei,subj,group )
Ratei,subj,group = !0 +!round +!condition + (usubj +ugroup + ei,subj,group )
Ratei,subj,group = !0 +!groupsize +!condition + (usubj +ugroup + ei,subj,group )
 
These tests supported the indifference of rate to group size and condition, and rejected 
the null hypothesis that rate is indifferent to round (Table 2). 
 Since rate is distributed on a circle (with rates of 23 adjacent to rates of 0), the data 
violate the distributional assumptions of a linear model. For example, the circular von 
Mises distribution fit a mean rate of 4.7, while the intercept of the linear model β0 was 
5.75, reflecting a drift towards 11.5 at the middle of the {1, …, 24} interval. We tested 
the robustness of the model to this violation by fitting four additional models whose rates 
had been shifted uniformly to three different points on the interval, 
(Ratei,subj,group ! 6)mod24 = !0 +!round +!groupsize +!condition + (usubj +ugroup + ei,subj,group )
(Ratei,subj,group + 6)mod24 = !0 +!round +!groupsize +!condition + (usubj +ugroup + ei,subj,group )
(Ratei,subj,group +12)mod24 = !0 +!round +!groupsize +!condition + (usubj +ugroup + ei,subj,group )
(Ratei,subj,group +18)mod24 = !0 +!round +!groupsize +!condition + (usubj +ugroup + ei,subj,group )
 
Obviously, these models fit different values of the mean rate β0. In all five models, the 
effect of round was significant, and the effects of group size and condition were 
insignificant (Table 3). The +0, +6, and +12 models fit comparable positive values to the 
coefficient βround, all near 0.01. By contrast, the equivalent -6 and +18 models fit (the 
same) negative value to βround. This is an understandable artifact; the distribution of rates 
will more flagrantly violate normality as its peak becomes centered at the “wraparound” 
point at 0 = 24 modulo 24. However, the distribution in the basic model (Rate + 0) 
should be robust to this violation of normality because its peak was far from the edges of 
the interval and the coefficient on even the strongest effect, βround, was not large enough 
for rates to circumlocute their range. Over 200 rounds, βround = 0.0085 corresponds to a 
total acceleration of 1.7 choices. 
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It is evident in visualizations of both the time and frequency domains that 
rotations accelerate over time (Figure 5), and the statistics support this conclusion. 
Analyzed within-subject and within-experiment, mean rate increased significantly over 
the 200 rounds of play (χ21=192, p<0.001; Table 2) by 1.7 choices. Group size and 
condition were not predictors of rate.  
 
Discussion 
The iterated elimination of non-rationalizable strategies behind Nash 
equilibrium is intended to mimic the human process of reasoning iteratively through the 
incentives of other people. By implication, increasing depths of human iterated 
reasoning are presumed to produce behavior increasingly consistent with Nash 
equilibria. Behavior in the Mod Game suggests that iterated reasoning may sustain 
periodic a behavior that does not converge to a fixed-point.  
The entropy, earnings, and clustering of behavior in the Mod Game are 
inconsistent with the uniformly random play prescribed by the mixed Nash equilibrium, 
and other popular solution concepts (Camerer, Ho, & Chong, 2002b; McKelvey & 
Palfrey, 1995). Furthermore, the persistent periodicity in observed choices is 
inconsistent with any fixed-point solution concept. These findings appear to place rather 
severe constraints on possible explanations of behavior in the Mod Game. They are, 
however, consistent with an explanation suggested by the participants themselves. 
Although introspective reports must be interpreted with caution, participants described 
an iterated reasoning process driving rotations through belief space (Shepard & Metzler, 
1971).  
Going back to Selten, research on iterated reasoning works towards proving that 
that use of iterated reasoning implies greater fidelity with equilibrium predictions. This 
cannot be the case if iterated reasoning in the Mod Game is driving periodic behavior. In 
fact, if trajectories in belief space describe circles around the Nash equilibrium, the 
prescriptions of iterated reasoning are literally orthogonal to it, and iterated reasoning is 
complicit in the convergence of sophisticated reasoners towards a periodic attractor.  
The heuristic learning direction theory is particularly promising for describing 
the individual reasoning process behind periodicity and group-level clustering. By this 
theory, participants learn to iterate through a limited k number of steps of reasoning 
through the reasoning of others (Nagel, 1995; Selten, 1998). As they gain experience, 
participants make minor myopic adjustments to their current k––up or down depending 
on the direction of their error in the previous round. With time, participants learn the 
mean sophistication of their group, and they either adjust their own level of 
sophistication or heuristically adjust their rate of rotation to mimic a given level of 
sophistication. Because participants had only 6 seconds to decide, it isn’t likely that they 
literally worked through the costly iteration process every round. But it also isn’t 
necessary––as long participants thought others were using iterated reasoning, or thought 
others might think others were, a participant could use the visual layout of choices as a 
heuristic proxy to mimic the full iterated reasoning process. Iterated reasoning, even if it 
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isn’t the actual process driving decisions in the Mod Game, still gives the most 
compelling conceptual scheme for explaining how participants reasoned through it.   
In the Mod Game, participants preferred rates of 1–11 to rates of 13–23 (by a 3:1 
ratio). Why is there such a strong regularity in rates across experimental sessions? There 
would be no such limit if participants used a theory-free empirical time-series method to 
learn their group’s emergent rate. But rates grounded in iterated reasoning would be 
expected to show precisely the limits observed. Camerer and Ho fit over one hundred 
games to an iterated reasoning model and found that a degree of ~1.5 thinking steps fit 
the best, and that most games elicit a range of 0–3 steps (Camerer, Ho, & Chong, 2004). 
From the perspective of iterated reasoning, the observed mean rate of 4.7 choices per 
round corresponds to 2.35 thinking steps––a hop of two choices for each additional level 
k––within the range of k’s observed in other experiments. A problem with applying 
iterated reasoning to an intransitive game is that we must assume that a 0-step reasoner 
preserves the previous round’s choice. This assumption is difficult to defend without 
resorting to more exotic behaviors, like the default heuristic (by which participants 
repeat their previous action when they lack a reason to change it) or strategic teaching 
(by which sophisticated participants “play dumb” to manipulate unsophisticated players 
into some favorable pattern of coordination) (Camerer, Ho, & Chong, 2002a; Gigerenzer 
& Todd, 1999). But research on thinking-steps can also account for the mean 
acceleration of 1.7 choices per round over 200 rounds. 1.7 choices would correspond to 
0.85 thinking steps, well within the increase of 0.5–1 thinking-step increase observed in 
other experiments (Camerer, 2003, p. 322; Duffy & Nagel, 1997; Stahl, 1999).  
Iterated reasoning is an active research subject, but researchers downplay the 
importance of the heuristic adjustment process that originally accompanied it 
(Costa-Gomes, Crawford, & Iriberri, 2009; Crawford & Iriberri, 2007b; T. H. Ho & Su, 
2011; Kawagoe & Takizawa, 2008; Stahl, 1999). However, the adjustments of learning 
direction theory are necessary to explain why 49% of non-zero adjustments to rate in the 
Mod Game were decelerations. Learning direction theory also provides an 
individual-level mechanism for group-level clustering (S. Frey & Goldstone, 2011).  
Dynamical systems and statistical mechanics offer powerful tools for 
characterizing the types of complex emergent patterns that we observe here.  
Intransitive dominance relations between distributed mobile agents have been shown to 
foster periodic dynamics universally (Reichenbach et al., 2007; Reichenbach, Mobilia, & 
Frey, 2008; Winkler, Reichenbach, & Frey, 2010). And in the Mod Game, clustering and 
periodicity may both fall out of a dynamic analogous to that driving the synchronization 
of systems of coupled oscillators (Mirollo & Strogatz, 1990). Specifically, clustering and 
convergence on a mean rate can be treated as phase-locking and frequency-locking, 
respectively. 
Generally, a satisfactory model of behavior in the Mod Game will make 
adjustments around a time-dependent rate, inducing non-stationary dynamics through a 
regime of stable cyclic attractors that captures both the persistent periodicity and the 
changes in rate over the course of the experiment. Limit cycles are the non-fixed-point 
attractors that have received the most attention in game theory, and the observed periodic 
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behavior is qualitatively consistent with this type of dynamic. But periodicity is also 
consistent with other dynamics, like quasi-cycles, quasi-periodic oscillations, some 
chaotic attractors, and even very slow cyclic transients towards a fixed point (Kantz & 
Schreiber, 2003; Turchin & Taylor, 1992).  
Most groups that played the Mod Game can be described as clustering and 
cycling stably at a slowly increasing rate. Qualitatively, there were some exceptions to 
the general trend. The middle columns of Figures S2-S9 show rates over time for 29 
sessions. Most groups exhibit coordination on a rate between 1 and 12 after some 
transient.  Group 3 showed a particularly long transient.  Groups 7 and 9 exhibit rates 
that are difficult to distinguish from random.  Clustering in discarded group 3 seems to 
dissolve half way through the experiment.  Participants in discarded groups 5 and 7 
seemed to converge to pure strategies.  The most interesting exceptions were groups 10 
and 12, which exhibited persistent clustering and cycling, but at much higher rates than 
those observed in any other group.  Group 12 settled at a rate of 12, and Group 10 
continued accelerating through the entire range of rates, such that they were rotating in 
the “wrong” direction by the end of the experiment. Overall, we do not make a strong 
claim as to whether rates stabilize or increase indefinitely. There seems to be 
heterogeneity between groups, with some converging upon a stable rate of rotation, and 
others continuing to accelerate through the whole session. 
The description of the subject pool mentions eight participants that made large 
numbers of repeated choices or null choices and that were excluded from the analysis. 
Including these participants does not affect the main results of this manuscript: rate of 
approximately 4, increasing significantly, and driving periodicity that registers a 
significant spike in a Fourier analysis. The biggest effect of including all of the data is in 
the polar histogram of rates––the second panel of Figure 3––which registers a larger 
spike at rate zero. But were participants sufficiently motivated? While participants were 
paid, rates were below the standard for economics laboratories; expected earnings were 
1¢ per point and mean earnings were $1.33 over ~30 minutes. Undermotivated behavior 
is traditionally invoked to explain deviations from predicted fixed-point behavior. Still, a 
constructive theory would be necessary to explain why these deviations were not to a 
poorly defined fixed point, but to a more profitable higher-dimensional attractor that has 
been anticipated for 50 years. Within some dynamical frameworks, limit cycle regimes 
are more prominent in games with lower payoffs (Galla & Farmer, 2011; Sato & 
Crutchfield, 2003). In this context, motivation is not a mere methodological nuisance 
(Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; Smith & Walker, 1993), but a theoretically grounded 
concept whose manipulations make substantive predictions, predictions that our work 
supports. 
Accepting the coexistence of iterated reasoning and periodic behavior does not 
fix all of the problems presented by this work. Existing models of complex learning 
dynamics cannot account for important features of periodicity in the Mod Game. If 
participants’ beliefs are traversing a limit cycle regime, these cycles are different from 
any that have been predicted. Participants choose their next move using a conception of 
rate that leads them to “hop” around the circle of choices. As groups, they coordinate 
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their hopping and cluster around specific choices. Neither of these behaviors has been 
predicted in the dynamics of game learning. Additionally, participants’ rates increase 
significantly over time, reflecting either convergence, in a non-stationary stochastic 
system, to a periodic attractor that is changing shape, or the ephemeral behavior of 
trajectories that are converging only slowly to a stationary periodic attractor.  
 
Conclusions 
We have used the Mod Game, an n-person generalization of Rock-Paper-Scissors, 
to document the emergence of a stable, profitable periodicity in group behavior. We 
argue that the interactions between bounded individuals led groups to cluster and cycle 
through the space of choices. These cycles reflect periodic trajectories through the space 
of participants’ probability vectors. In people, these trajectories can only be inferred via 
observable behavior, so we cannot offer more direct support for the hypothesis that 
participants’ beliefs have converged upon a regime of stable periodic trajectories.  
Cycles in the belief space of learning agents have been predicted for many years, 
particularly in games with intransitive dominance relations, like Matching Pennies and 
Rock-Paper-Scissors, but experimentalists have only recently started looking to these 
dynamics for experimental predictions. This work should function to caution 
experimentalists of the dangers of treating dynamics as ephemeral deviations from a 
static solution concept. Periodic behavior in the Mod Game, which is stable and efficient, 
challenges the preconception that coordination mechanisms must converge on equilibria 
or other fixed-point solution concepts to be promising for social applications. This 
behavior also reveals that iterated reasoning and stable high-dimensional dynamics can 
coexist, challenging recent models whose implementation of sophisticated reasoning 
implies convergence to a fixed point (Camerer, Ho, & Chong, 2002a). Applied to real 
complex social systems, this work gives credence to recent predictions of chaos in 
financial market game dynamics (Galla & Farmer, 2011). Applied to game learning, our 
support for cyclic regimes vindicates the general presence of complex attractors, and 
should help motivate their adoption into the game theorist’s canon of solution concepts.  
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Figure 1  
Experiment interface. This screenshot was taken during a pilot increment session, after 
all decisions had been submitted, and as all decisions and rewards in a round were being 
reported. Participants saw their own choices as the red ‘X’. Previous experiments have 
tested the same rule with visual arrangements besides the circle (S. Frey & Goldstone, 
2011). See Video S1 for the complete video for a typical session. 
 
Figure 2  
Observed mean entropy, efficiency, and distance compared to random. The boxes 
report means of observed behavior with bootstrapped 99% confidence intervals. The 
crosses give values expected from uniformly random behavior. 
 
Figure 3  
Distributions of observed choices, rates, and accelerations. The top panel compares 
distributions over the twenty-four choices, over increment and decrement conditions, 
against a random baseline. Without temporal information, aggregated choices are 
difficult to distinguish from uniformly random behavior. The middle panel compares 
distributions of participant rates. The observed distribution is consistent with the 
measured mean rate of 4.7 choices per round, forward or backward for increment and 
decrement conditions, respectively. The bottom panel illustrates accelerations (the 
difference between consecutive first differences). Observed accelerations are consistent 
with behavior that either maintains the previous round’s rate or makes only minor 
adjustments to it. Note that, since the null hypothesis is identical across measures, the 




Figure 4  
Aggregated frequency spectra of participant time series, with baseline and 
predictions. The frequency spectra for the first and second 100 rounds of the 
experiment show the development of cycles. For consistency, the horizontal axis is in 
units of rate rather than frequency. The frequency spectrum shows a prominent spike in 
the latter half of the experiment, corresponding to a rate of rotation of about 7 choices 
per round. This spectrum is the aggregate of spectra from many statistically independent 
sessions. To control for artifacts and maintain independence, the data were transformed 
and resampled before transformation to the frequency domain. The dark vertical bar 
illustrates the spike location predicted by the mean rate. The lighter bars give 
predictions for mean rates calculated using only the first (left) and second (right) 100 
rounds of play.  
 
Figure 5 
Mean rates in time and aggregate spectrogram. The left panel shows the mean rate 
in each group, at each round. The right panel shows a spectrogram (with a window size 
of 20 rounds) for resampled observed data. These figures show changes in rotation over 
the sequence of 200 rounds of play. In the spectrogram, the brightness of a pixel 
indicates the amplitude of the corresponding frequency component. These panels show 





Supporting Figure Legends 
 
Figure S1  
Video of experimental session. This video shows a screen capture of session #21, sped 
up approximately 30 times.  While some groups never exhibited periodic behavior, this 
group was typical of that majority that did. Though this video is taken from the 
experimenter’s perspective, participants saw nearly the same view, including complete 
information after every round as to every player’s position and earnings.  The 
differences are that they had feedback on their accumulated earnings, and they saw their 
own icon as a red ‘X’.	  
 
Figure S2  
Choice, rate, and acceleration data for groups 1–4. Within each row of three graphs, 
dot colors designate the same group member. 
 
Figure S3  
Choice, rate, and acceleration data for groups 5–8.  
 
Figure S4  
Choice, rate, and acceleration data for groups 9–12.  
 
Figure S5  
Choice, rate, and acceleration data for groups 13–16.  
 
Figure S6  
Choice, rate, and acceleration data for groups 17–20.  
 
Figure S7  
Choice, rate, and acceleration data for groups 21–22.  
 
Figure S8 















Group size	   Condition Time, Date 
1 7 decrement 11:00, 2011/09/15 
2 3 decrement 12:00, 2011/09/30 
3 10 increment 13:00, 2011/09/15 
4 5 increment 11:00, 2011/09/22 
5 2 decrement 11:00, 2011/09/23 
6 6 decrement 11:00, 2011/09/16 
7 9 increment 12:00, 2011/09/08 
8 8 decrement 12:00, 2011/09/09 
9 3 increment 12:00, 2011/09/14 
10 9 decrement 11:00, 2011/09/09 
11 8 decrement 13:00, 2011/09/08 
12 7 increment 12:00, 2011/09/16 
13 2 decrement 10:00, 2011/09/30 
14 3 increment 11:00, 2011/09/21 
15 8 decrement 11:00, 2011/09/08 
16 2 increment 11:00, 2011/10/07 
17 5 increment 11:00, 2011/12/05 
18 6 decrement 09:00, 2011/12/05 
19 8 increment 12:00, 2011/12/01 
20 3 increment 11:00, 2011/11/30 
21 3 decrement 12:00, 2011/11/17 
22 5 decrement 12:00, 2011/11/10 
Discard 1 8 increment 12:00, 2011/09/15 
Discard 2 9 increment 15:00, 2011/12/07 
Discard 3 9 decrement 14:00, 2011/12/07 
Discard 4 7 increment 10:00, 2011/12/05 
Discard 5 5 increment 11:00, 2011/12/01 
Discard 6 4 increment 11:00, 2011/11/18 
















This table reports effects of χ 2 tests on reduced models. Bold coefficients are significant. 
 coefficient df LL χ2 χ2 df p value 
full model  7 -76579    
intercept 5.75 6 -76591 23.9 1 <0.001 
round 0.00854 6 -76675 192 1 <0.001 
group size 0.239 6 -76581 2.51 1 0.113 












Bold coefficients are significant at p < 0.001. Other coefficients are not significant below 
p < 0.05.  With rate defined on a lattice of diameter 24, Rate + 18 = Rate – 6. 
  
 
 β0 βround βgroupsize βcondition 
Rate +0 ( base model) 5.75 0.00854 0.239 0.269 
Rate +6 7.25 0.0156 0.422 0.239 
Rate +12 12.5 0.00776 -0.196 -0.266 
Rate +18, Rate – 6 20.6 -0.0136 -0.925 -0.268 
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